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BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES AND
THE EU LEGAL ORDER: IMPLICATIONS OF
THE LISBON TREATY
INTRODUCTION

F

oreign direct investment (“FDI”)1 is the “lifeblood of the global
economy.”2 Foreign investors of developed, capital-exporting
countries pursue opportunities abroad in efforts to obtain the highest returns on their investments, as well as to solidify positions in emerging
markets.3 Meanwhile, developing, capital-importing countries seek to
attract capital flows and new technologies in efforts to enhance their
economies and improve their competitive standing in the global marketplace.4 In recent decades FDI flows dramatically surged,5 a trend that is
1. The International Monetary Fund and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development define direct “foreign investment” as cross-border investment made by a resident entity in one economy (the “direct investor” or “multinational
enterprise”) with the objective of establishing a lasting interest in an enterprise resident in
an economy other than that of the direct investor (the “foreign affiliate”). See International Monetary Fund [IMF], Balance of Payments Manual, at 86, (5th ed. 1993); see also
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], Detailed Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct Investment, at 7–8, (3d ed. 1996).
2. See Bernardo M. Cremades & David J. A. Cairns, Contract and Treaty Claims
and Choice of Forum in Foreign Investment Disputes, in ARBITRATING FOREIGN
INVESTMENT DISPUTES 325, 325 (Norbert Horn & Stefan Kroll, eds., 2004); see also Karl
P. Sauvant & Lisa E. Sachs, THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT:
BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES, AND INVESTMENT
FLOWS lx (2009) (stating that “[o]ne uncontroversial truth is that virtually all countries
value FDI as a means to advance their economic development” and thus “compete with
each other to attract investment”).
3. See U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev. [UNCTAD], World Investment Report
2003: FDI Policies for Development; National and International Perspectives, xv, U.N.
Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2003 (Sept. 4, 2003) (stating that “intense competition continues to
force [transnational corporations] to invest in new markets and to seek access to low-cost
resources and factors of production”).
4. See id. at iii (stating that due to its “enormous potential to create jobs, raise productivity, enhance exports and transfer technology, foreign direct investment is a vital
factor in the long-term economic development of the world’s developing countries”).
5. See MIRIAN KENE OMALU, NAFTA AND THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY:
COMPLIANCE WITH, IMPLEMENTATION, AND EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS 1–2 (NAFTA Law and Policy Series vol. 5, 1998) (stating that
in 1980, FDI was estimated at $40 billion; in 1994 it jumped to $222 billion; by 1995 it
had reached $315 billion); see also UNCTAD, Assessing the Impact of the Current Financial and Economic Crisis on Global FDI Flows, 3, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2009/3 (Jan. 19, 2009) (stating that the year 2007 saw unprecedented levels of FDI flows, “reaching a historic record of $1.8 trillion”); Jeswald W. Salacuse
& Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work?: An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment
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expected to continue.6 Coinciding with this surge is the proliferation of a
dense network of international agreements pertaining to the protection of
foreign investment,7 most notably bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”).8
BITs are agreements between two countries that provide substantive
standards for the protection of foreign investment, as well as procedures
for dispute settlement.9 In the absence of a comprehensive international
legal framework or general customary international law governing foreign investment,10 BITs have become the “dominant international vehicle
through which investment is regulated.”11 In recent decades, BITs have
flourished to unprecedented levels.12
While the legal infrastructure created by the BIT network operates on
an international scale, BITs have become especially prevalent in the Eu-

Treaties and Their Grand Bargain 46 HARV. INT’L L. J. 67, 71 (2005) (stating that between 1973 and 2000, FDI growth exceeded that of international trade twelvefold).
6. See UNCTAD, World Investment Prospects Survey 2009–2011, 9, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2009/8 (2009) (stating that while the global economic and financial
crisis caused significant declines in global FDI flows in 2008 and 2009, a recovery is
expected beginning in 2010 and will continue to gain momentum through 2011).
7. See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Brief History of International Investment Agreements, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 157, 157 (2005).
8. See Efraim Chalamish, The Future of Bilateral Investment Treaties: A De Facto
Multilateral Agreement?, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 303, 305 (2009). BITs are part of the
larger category of international investment agreements (IIAs), which also includes free
trade agreements (FTAs) and regional trade agreements. FTAs and regional trade agreement contain foreign investment-related provisions, but such provisions are not their
primary focus. This Note is concerned only with BITs, which typically deal exclusively
with foreign investment and are the most proliferated type of IIA.
9. See Stephen M. Schwebel, The Overwhelming Merits of Bilateral Investment
Agreements, 32 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 263, 263 (2009).
10. See infra Part I.A; see also Kelly Connolly, Note, Say What You Mean: Improved
Drafting Resources as a Means for Increasing the Consistency of Interpretation of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1579, 1609–1610 (2007).
11. Andrew T. Guzman, Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties,
in THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: BILATERAL INVESTMENT
TREATIES, DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES, AND INVESTMENT FLOWS 73 (2009).
12. See Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 5, at 75 (stating that the impetus of this proliferation is the “desire of companies of industrialized states to invest safely and securely
in developing countries, as well as the consequent need to create a stable international
legal framework to facilitate and protect those investments”); see also ANDREW
NEWCOMBE & LLUIS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 46–48
(2009) (By 1979, states had entered into approximately 100 BITs, by 1987, 265 BITs had
been concluded, and by the end of the 1990s, 1,857 BITs had been concluded); Press
Release, UNCTAD, Bilateral Investment Treaties Quintupled During the 1990s, U.N.
Doc. TAD/INF/2877 (Dec. 15, 2000) (stating that there were 1,857 BITs by the end of
the 1990s, while there had only been 385 at the end of the 1980s).
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ropean Union (“EU”).13 The modern BIT originated in Europe when the
first BIT was concluded14 between the Federal Republic of Germany and
Pakistan on November 25, 1959.15 Since that time, EU Member States
have constituted a majority of the most prolific negotiators of these treaties.16 Central and Eastern European countries in particular have concluded a large number of BITs17 and continue to be considered attractive
locations for FDI by foreign investors.18
As the number of BITs concluded by EU Member States continues to
grow, the nature of the relationship between these treaties and the EU
legal order garners increasing attention.19 This is because the relatively
recent accession of many Central and Eastern European countries implicates the potential for conflict between EU legal requirements and BITs
both between EU Member States (hereinafter, intra-EU BITs) and between EU Member States and non-EU Member States (hereinafter, extraEU BITs).20 In the context of BITs between Member States, the obligations under these BITs may be inconsistent with or superseded by EU
law and, therefore, should be terminated.21 With respect to BITs between
13. Seventy new BITs were concluded between June 2005 and June 2006. Of those
seventy, EU Member States (excluding South-East Europe and the Commonwealth of
Independent States) concluded the highest number of BITs, with forty-nine new agreements during this time period. UNCTAD, International Investment Rule-Setting: Trends,
Emerging Issues and Implications, 3, 5, U.N. Doc. TD/B/COM.2/73 (Jan. 5, 2007).
14. To conclude a treaty is to ratify or formalize it. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 126
(3d ed. 2006).
15. See Treaty for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Pak.—F.R.G. Nov.
25, 1959, 457 U.N.T.S. 23 [hereinafter Pak.—F.R.G. BIT].
16. Germany, Switzerland, the UK, Italy, France, the Netherlands, and Belgium Luxembourg were seven among the top ten signatories of BITs up until 2008. UNCTAD,
Recent Developments in International Investment Agreements, 3, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/IA/2009/8 (2008).
17. See Anca Radu, Foreign Investors in the EU—Which ‘Best Treatment’? Interactions Between Bilateral Investment Treaties and EU Law, 14 EUR. L. J. 237, 238 (Mar.
2008).
18. See Stanimir Alexandrov, The Future of Investment Treaty Protection in Eastern
&
MIDDLE
E.
ARB.
REV.
(2009),
available
at
Europe,
EUR.
http://www.globalarbitrationreview.com/reviews/14/sections/53/chapters/511/the-futureinvestment-treaty-protection-eastern-europe/, for a description of the recent, dramatic
increase in FDI in Eastern Europe.
19. See Michele Potesta, Bilateral Investment Treaties and the European Union. Recent Developments in Arbitration and Before the ECJ, 8 LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTL.
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 225, 230 (2009).
20. See Thomas Eilmansberger, Bilateral Investment Treaties and EU Law, 46
COMM. MKT. L. REV. 383, 387 (2009).
21. See Christer Soderlund, Intra-EU Investment Protection and the EC Treaty, 24 J.
INT’L. ARB. 455, 455 (2007).
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Member States and Non-Member States, the potential exists for direct
conflict between BITs and EU law, since EU law requires Member States
to take all necessary steps to eliminate incompatibility between the EC
Treaty and any other agreements to which they are a party.22
While the current interface between BITs and the EU legal order reveals a degree of legal uncertainty in need of reconciliation, the individual EU Member States have retained jurisdiction over foreign investment,
and thus the ability to negotiate and conclude international investment
agreements.23 However, this may change now that the Lisbon Treaty entered into force on December 1, 2009.24 The Lisbon Treaty is an international agreement between EU Member States that amends the current
sources of EU law, namely the EU Treaty and the EC Treaty.25 Its provisions seek to “enhanc[e] the efficiency and democratic legitimacy of the
Union and to improv[e] the coherence of its action.”26 In one of its most
novel provisions, the Lisbon Treaty transfers competence27 over FDI
from the Member States to the EU by bringing it under the ambit of the
EU’s Common Commercial Policy (“CCP”).28 While the treaty’s language with respect to FDI appears unequivocal, it is nevertheless unclear
how it will be interpreted and applied, and therefore, the practical effects
it will have on the current EU BIT network. Many questions remain unanswered:
22. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, 25 March 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter EC Treaty]; see also Radu, supra note 17, at 238.
23. See Radu, supra note 17, at 238.
24. All 27 Member States ratified the Lisbon Treaty. The treaty passed by referendum
in Ireland, and on November 3, 2009, it was signed by the president of the Czech Republic, the final country to sign on. Lisbon Treaty, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2010), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/info/treaty-of-lisbon/.
25. See generally Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the
Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 3, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1 [hereinafter Lisbon Treaty].
26. See Lisbon Treaty, supra note 25, at 3 (preamble); see also Dr. Simon Duke, The
Lisbon Treaty and External Relations, Bulletin of the European Institute of Public Administrations No. 2008/01, 13 (“[T]he Lisbon Treaty holds enormous potential for a more
coherent Union on the international stage).
27. Competence is akin to sovereignty. See DANIEL C. K. CHOW & THOMAS J.
SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: PROBLEMS, CASES AND MATERIALS 124
(2008) (stating that the “debate over the external relations power in the EC/EU concerns
primarily whether the EC/EU has exclusive competence to negotiate and conclude international treaties binding upon its member states or whether there is a shared competence
with its member states allowing the states to participate in the negotiations and conclusion of the agreements”).
28. See Marc Bungenberg Going Global? The EU Common Commercial Policy After
Lisbon in EUROPEAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 124 (C. Herrmann & J.P. Terhechte eds., 2009).
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 Will EU Member States retain the competence to negotiate and
conclude BITs in the future?
 What is the legal status of existing BITs concluded by EU Member States?
 Is the EU capable of concluding international investment agreements comparable to BITs?
This Note argues that the EU’s current system of BITs should remain
intact in the short term because it provides for investment protection and
arbitral dispute mechanisms of which there are no viable equivalents under the Lisbon Treaty. Part I provides a brief history of the development
of the modern BIT. Part II offers an overview of the current, wellestablished system of both intra-EU BITs and extra-EU BITs. Part III
describes the changes pertaining to FDI introduced by the Lisbon Treaty.
Part IV examines the problems that will likely arise as a result of these
changes and proposes the implementation of interim measures to facilitate the gradual transition from a system of Member States mixed competence to a system of EU exclusive competence. This Note concludes
that while EU competence over FDI is a logical step in the movement
toward a more streamlined, comprehensive, multilateral EU trade and
investment system, an expedited overhaul of the current legal structure
would foster uncertainty and be detrimental to the EU’s continued ability
to attract FDI and manage foreign-investor expectations.
I. BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES AND THE EU LEGAL ORDER
A. A Brief History of BITs Concluded by EU Member States
The development of the modern BIT originated in Europe in the period
following World War II,29 at which time individual European countries
began to negotiate treaties dealing exclusively with foreign investment.30
The objective of these treaties was to protect foreign investors against
uncompensated expropriation,31 an area not covered by customary inter29. See Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 5, at 68 (stating that in the period after World
War II, “foreign investors who sought the protection of international investment law encountered an ephemeral structure consisting largely of scattered treaty provisions, a few
questionable customs, and contested general principles of law”).
30. See RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGARET STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES
10–11 (1995) (providing a historical context of BITs as an outgrowth of FCNs).
31. See Rodney Neufeld, Trade and Investment, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 636–637 (Daniel Bethlehem et al. eds., 2009) (stating
that “direct expropriation involves the taking of an investment by the host State through
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national law.32 The first BIT was concluded between the Federal Republic of Germany and Pakistan in 1959,33 after which several other European countries followed suit.34 In the late 1980s, in efforts to attract foreign investment and to encourage economic development, several of the
countries that now comprise Central and Eastern Europe concluded BITs
with developed countries.35 European countries alone concluded fortyseven BITs between January 2005 and June 2006.36 While less than five
hundred BITs were in force in the 1990s,37 there are currently more than
2,600 in force.38 BITs were initially concluded asymmetrically between a
developed and a developing country,39 but this arrangement is slowly
seizure of the property or interest, or through its compulsory transfer, for example, to a
state-owned enterprise or domestic investor . . . an indirect expropriation often consists of
a series of government acts that has the effect of rendering the investor’s property rights
useless”).
32. See NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 12, at 41 (stating that the development
of international investment agreements “was primarily a response to the uncertainties and
inadequacies of the customary international law of state responsibility for injuries to
aliens and their property”); see also M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON
FOREIGN INVESTMENT 89 (2d ed. 2004) (stating that while it is a principle of customary
law that when a host country unlawfully takes the property of the foreign investor it must
compensate the foreign investor for this taking, there is considerable disagreement on this
standard of compensation and how it should be calculated); Andrew T. Guzman, Why
LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment
Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 639, 641 (1998) (Prior to WWII, expropriation of a foreign
investor’s property was governed by the “Hull Rule” under customary international law,
which required that compensation for expropriation be “prompt, adequate, and effective.”
However, this rule fell out of favor following WWII).
33. See Pak.—F.R.G. BIT, supra note 15; see also UNCTAD, Bilateral Investment
Treaties in the Mid–1990s, 177–179, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/7 (1998) (reporting
historical statistics of all of the BITs entered into by Germany); UNCTC, Bilateral Investment Treaties, 7, U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/65 (stating that Germany was particularly concerned with the future protection of its foreign investments, as it had lost all of its foreign
assets following WWI and WWII).
34. See NEWCOMBE & LLUIS PARADELL, supra note 12, at 42–43 (stating that the capital-exporting states of Switzerland, the Netherlands, Italy, the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union (BLEU), Sweden, Denmark, Norway, France, and the UK began to conclude BITs soon after Germany).
35. See UNCTAD, International Investment Rule-making: Stocktaking, Challenges
and the Way Forward, 15, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2007/3 (2008).
36. See Radu, supra note 17, at 238.
37. See id. at 237.
38. 2,676 BITs were in effect as of 2009. UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2009:
Transnational Corporations, Agricultural Development and Development, xxii, U.N.
Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2009 (2009).
39. See UNCTAD, Bilateral Investment Treaties 1959–1999, 1–2, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2 (2000) (stating that BITs were initially concluded between a developed, capital-exporting country and a developing, capital-importing country. Developing
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eroding as developing countries enter into BITs with other developing
countries and transition economies pursue BITs on their own.40
This expansive and growing network of BITs is a by-product of repeatedly failed efforts to establish an international investment framework.41 In 1995, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”)42 attempted to negotiate the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (“MAI”).43 The MAI sought to consolidate rules on
international foreign investment into a single legal instrument that would
be open to accession by both OECD and non-OECD members.44 However, this agreement met a great deal of opposition and was consequently
abandoned in 1998.45 The objective of the MAI was resurrected in 2001
when the WTO Doha Ministerial Conference agreed to take up negotiations on trade and investment beginning in 2003, and established a negotiating group on trade and investment.46 This plan was similarly abandoned in 2004.47 Due to the lack of an international framework governing FDI, the dense network of BITs “[f]or all practical purposes . . . has
become the fundamental source of international law in the area of foreign
investment.”48
B. The Basic Features of BITs
BITs contain substantive provisions for the protection of foreign investment as well as procedural provisions for investment dispute resolution.49 In terms of substantive provisions, the vast majority of BITs idencountries entered into BITs in order to attract foreign investors and reap the benefits of
FDI. However, beginning in the late 1980s, this paradigm shifted and BITs were increasingly concluded between two developing countries).
40. See Andrea K. Bjorklund, Reconciling State Sovereignty and Investor Protection
in Denial of Justice Claims 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 809, 832 (2005).
41. See
UNCTAD,
Lessons
from
the
MAI,
U.N.
Doc.
No.
UNCTAD/ITE/ITT/Misc.22 (1999).
42. The OECD, “based in Paris, is an organization of thirty leading industrialized
countries that deals with economic and social issues of concern to its members.” It works
with the Bretton Woods institutions and the WTO. CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 27,
at 20–21.
43. See SORNARAJAH, supra note 32, at 291.
44. See Alfred Escher, The Multilateral Investment Treaty, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 69 (Daniel D. Bradlow & Alfred Escher, eds. 1999).
45. See UNCTAD, Lessons from the MAI, supra note 41.
46. See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 27, at 324.
47. Id.
48. SALACUSE & SULLIVAN, supra note 5, at 70.
49. See Theresa McGhie, Bilateral and Multilateral Investment Treaties, in LEGAL
ASPECTS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 109 (Daniel D. Bradlow & Alfred Escher eds.,
1999).
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tify the scope of investments covered under the respective treaty.50 The
very first BIT, between Germany and Pakistan, provided for a broad definition of “investment.”51 This inclusiveness is characteristic of the BITs
concluded over the past fifty years.52 While the breadth of coverage of
investment articulated in a BIT can vary based upon the intentions of the
negotiating parties,53 the prevailing definition adopted by BITs concluded by EU Member States describes “investment” as including “every
kind of asset.”54 This encompassing definition, thus, goes beyond the
coverage of FDI55 and can even extend protection to portfolio investments.56

50. See DOLZER AND STEVENS, supra note 30, at 25–26.
51. See Pak.—F.R.G. BIT, supra note 15, art. 8 (stating that the term “investment shall
comprise capital brought into the territory of the other Party for investment in various
forms in the shape of assets such as foreign exchange, goods, property rights, patents and
technical knowledge. The term “investment” shall also include the returns derived from
and ploughed back into such “investment” . . . Any partnerships, companies or assets of
similar kind, created by the utilization of the above-mentioned assets shall be regarded as
“investment”).
52. “Investment” is typically defined very broadly in BITs, and includes both the
tangible and intangible assets of the foreign investor. See SORNARAHAH, supra note 32, at
220–221.
53. See UNCTAD, Bilateral Investment Treaties 1995–2006: Trends in Investment
Rulemaking, 7, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2006/5 (2007) [hereinafter UNCTAD, BITs
1995–2006] (stating that some BITs define “investment” broadly, but additionally provide for a list of clarifications limiting or excluding particular kinds of investments).
54. DOLZER AND STEVENS, supra note 30, at 27; see also UNCTAD, BITs 1995–2006,
supra note 53, at 8 (stating that the “asset-based” definition of “investment” usually includes “five categories of assets: first, movable and immovable property and any related
property rights such as mortgages, liens or pledges, second, various types of interests in
companies, such as shares, stock, bonds, debentures or any other form of participation in
a company, business enterprise or joint venture; third, claims to money and claims under
a contract having a financial value and loans directly related to a specific investment;
fourth, intellectual property rights; and fifth, business concessions, that is rights conferred
by law or under contracts”).
55. See UNCTAD, BITs 1995–2006, supra note 53, at 8; see also Neufeld, supra note
31, at 621 (“To ‘invest’ means to expend money, effort, or time into an undertaking with
the intention of deriving profit. However, ‘foreign direct investment’ (FDI) implies something more than the mere purchase of shares for the sake of the interest, dividends or
profits. Traditionally, States have distinguished FDI from other investment . . . FDI distinguishes itself from portfolio investment in that it ‘consists of a transaction made by a
foreigner in a host state which is intended to set up a long term relationship with a party
in the host state’”).
56. See Neufeld, supra note 31, at 622 (stating that portfolio investment is any type of
foreign investment that is not classified as FDI); see also SORNARAHAH, supra note 32, at
227 (describing portfolio investment as “[investment] instruments connected with companies like shares or unconnected with them like promissory notes and bonds”).
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BITs can vary in substantive detail, but their structure and general
composition are relatively uniform.57 They contain preliminary statements that articulate their purpose and aim, typically the “reciprocal encouragement and protection of investment flows between the two
states.”58 They provide for core protections including national treatment,59 most favored nation (“MFN”) treatment,60 compensation for expropriation,61 and rights to transfer capital and returns.62 Due to this protective framework for substantive rights, BITs play an important role in
alleviating the concerns and vulnerabilities of foreign investors who assume the inherent risks associated with FDI.63
In the event that a party to a BIT does not comply with its treaty obligations, BITs also contain provisions for investment dispute resolution.64
Arguably, the most significant facet of BITs is their provision for investor-state dispute settlement, in which foreign investors may directly sub57. See SORNARAHAH, supra note 32, at 89.
58. Id. at 217.
59. In the context of BITs, national treatment refers to the “obligation of contracting
parties to grant investors of the other contracting party treatment no less favourable than
the treatment they grant to investments of their own investors. The effect is to create a
level playing field between foreign and domestic investors in the relevant market.”
UNCTAD, BITs 1995–2006, supra note 53, at 33.
60. In the context of BITs, the MFN treatment standard “means that investments or
investors of one contracting party are entitled to treatment by the other contracting party
that is no less favourable than the treatment the latter grants to investments or investors of
any other third country.” See id. at 38.
61. J. Frederick Truitt, Expropriation of Foreign Investment: Summary of the Post
World War II Experience of American and British Investors in Less Developed Countries,
1 J. INT’L BUS. STUDIES 21, 24 (1970) (defining expropriation as “an official taking by a
sovereign state of the tangible property of alien corporate ownership with a view toward
the continued exploitation of that property for the public utility of the expropriating state
in lieu of continued ownership and control by private foreign enterprise”); see also
Schwebel, supra note 9, at 265–266 (“If there is a taking by the state of the foreign investment, by means direct or indirect, the state is treaty-bound to pay prompt, adequate
and effective compensation”).
62. See NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 12, at 43; see also Press Release,
UNCTAD, Analysis of Bilateral Investment Treaties Finds Growth in Agreements, New
Areas of Focus, UNCTAD/PRESS/IN/2007/014 (Dec. 4, 2007), available at
http://www.unctad.org/templates/Webflyer.asp?docID=8270&intItemID=1528&lang=1
(report concludes that “more countries concluding these treaties are placing greater emphasis on public concerns such as health, environment, core labour rights, national security, transparency in information exchange and rulemaking”).
63. The “basic assumptions behind BITs are that a bilateral treaty with clear and enforceable rules to protect and facilitate foreign investment reduces risks that the investor
would otherwise face and that such reductions in risks, all things being equal, encourage
investment.” Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 5, at 77.
64. See id. at 87.
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mit violations of BITs by a host state to international arbitration.65 Foreign investors consider these arbitration proceedings, which are outside
the jurisdiction of the host state, preferable to filing a claim against the
host state in its domestic courts.66 This is because this system prevents
the host state from enjoying a “home court advantage.”67
The main forum chosen for dispute settlement is the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”),68 which was formally established in 1965 for the primary purpose of resolving disputes
between host countries and foreign private investors.69 Other forums for
dispute arbitration include the International Center for Dispute Resolution, the International Chamber of Commerce, and the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce.70 According to statistics
from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, by the
end of 2007, there were two hundred and ninety known investment treaty
arbitrations, the majority of which were commenced under BITs.71 While
65. See Alexandrov, supra note 18. (The judgments awarded in these arbitrations are
binding, and may require that the host state “pay substantial monetary damages to the
injured investor”); see also Jarrod Wong, Umbrella Clauses in Bilateral Investment Treaties: Of Breaching of Contract, Treaty Violations, and the Divide Between Developing
and Developed Countries in Foreign Investment Disputes, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 135,
142 (2006). Wong explains: “[s]ignificantly, only states (and not the investors) enter into
BITs. Notwithstanding, the investor is able to enforce directly its rights under the BIT
through the BIT’s dispute settlement provisions.” Id. at 142; Salacuse & Sullivan, supra
note 5, at 88 (stating that “granting a private party the right to bring an action in an international tribunal against a sovereign state with respect to an investment dispute is a revolutionary innovation that now seems to be taken for granted”); Schwebel, supra note 9, at
267 (stating that “[t]his extraordinary innovation displaces the uneven intervention of
states in exercise of their right of diplomatic protection of the interests of their nationals
by according the foreign investor standing under international law, by virtue of the treaty,
to pursue arbitration against the host state”).
66. See Schwebel, supra note 9, at 263 (Foreign investors seeking legal recourse for
the violation of BIT provisions may consider the domestic courts to be biased against
them. The foreign investor could alternatively seek legal intervention from the country of
which they were a national, but this too was not always an effective route for the foreign
investor).
67. George M. von Mehren, Navigating Through Investor-State Arbitrations – An
Overview of Bilateral Investment Treaty Claims, 59 DISP. RESOL. J. 69, 70 (1994).
68. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575, U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID
Convention].
69. See SORNARAJAH, supra note 32, at 250.
70. See von Mehren, supra note 67, at 70.
71. Between 1987 and 2007, seventy-eight percent of investment treaty arbitrations
were brought on allegations of the violation of a BIT. See UNCTAD, Latest Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement, 1, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/IIA/2008/3
(2008).
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these arbitrations have been criticized for their lack of uniformity and
transparency in decision-making,72 they nevertheless offer benefits to
host countries and investors.73 Dispute settlement provisions in BITs
providing for this type of arbitration enable host countries to attract foreign investment, and allow foreign investors to “manage the risk associated with investing in a foreign country.”74
II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BITS AND THE PRE-LISBON EU LEGAL
ORDER
A. The Division of Competences
The structure of the EU legal order is quite complex, consisting of a
supranational legal system which coexists alongside the legal systems of
the individual Member States.75 Under this arrangement, Member States
transfer some of their national sovereignty to the European Community
(“EC”),76 and in effect become governed by Community law.77 Up until
the passage of the Lisbon Treaty, the primary sources of Community law
were a set of treaties which formed the basis for “everything the EU
does.”78 The most important of these treaties are the EC Treaty79 (also
72. For an in-depth discussion of the negative impact of inconsistent interpretations
of BITs by ad hoc arbitration panels, see CONNOLLY, supra note 10. See generally Susan
Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521 (2005).
73. See von Mehren, supra note 67, at 76.
74. Id.
75. See Matej Avbelj, The EU and the Many Faces of Legal Pluralism. Toward a
Coherent or Uniform EU Legal Order?, 2 CROATION YEARBOOK OF EUROPEAN LAW AND
POLICY 377, 380 (2006).
76. See DERRICK WYATT & ALAN ASHWOOD, EUROPEAN UNION LAW 125 (5th ed.
2006); see also Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos V. Nederlanse Administratie det Melastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 3, Summary ¶ 3 (stating that “the European Economic Community
constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit of which the states have
limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and the subjects of which comprise not only the Member States but also their nationals”); CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra
note 27, at 124 (stating that the EU’s structure consists of “three pillars,” one of which is
the EC which carries out the legal functions of the EU).
77. See JEAN-VICTOR LOUIS, THE COMMUNITY LEGAL ORDER 11 (European Communities 2d ed. 1990).
78. The Lisbon Treaty amends, but does not replace these treaties. To avoid confusion, Part II.C of this Note discusses the EC Treaty and the EU Treaty in the present
tense, as the majority of their provisions remain intact; see also KAREN DAVIES,
UNDERSTANDING EUROPEAN UNION LAW 48 (3rd ed. 2007) (stating that these treaties
include the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community 1951; the Treaty
establishing the European Atomic Energy Community 1957; the Treaty establishing the
European Economic Community 1957; the Merger Treaty 1965; the Budgetary Treaties
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known as the Treaty of Rome or the Treaty establishing the European
Economic Community) and the EU Treaty80 (also known as the Maastricht Treaty or the Treaty on the European Union). The EC Treaty is the
major governing instrument in the EU, regarded as a kind of constitution.81 Its scope includes economic, social, environmental, and regional
policies.82 The EC Treaty seeks “to lay the foundation of an ever closer
union among the peoples of Europe,” and to “strengthen the unity” of the
Member State economies.83 The EU Treaty, which entered into force in
1994, created the “three pillar” structure that forms the basis of the “European Union.”84 In its preamble, the EU Treaty sets as its objective the
“strengthening and the convergence” of the Member State economies.85
Thus, together these treaties set forth the broad goals of integrating the
EU Member States and facilitating cooperation at the political, social,
and in particular, economic level.
Despite the EU’s broad goal of an integrated Europe, it may only act
within the confines of the powers attributed to it by Community law under various treaties.86 Community competence, or sovereignty, is divided
into three principal categories: exclusive, shared, and supporting.87 In
areas of exclusive Community competence, power is held solely by the
1970 and 1975; the Single European Union Act 1986; the Treaty on European Union
1992; the Treaty of Amsterdam 1997; the Treaty of Nice 2000.)
79. See EC Treaty, supra note 22.
80. See Treaty on European Union (EU), 7 February 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1, 31
I.L.M. 253 [hereinafter EU Treaty].
81. LINDA SENDEN, SOFT LAW IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 37 (2004). Because the
EC Treaty is the most comprehensive treaty governing the EU, the EU law discussed in
this Note relies predominantly on the EC Treaty.
82. See Id.
83. EC Treaty, supra note 22, at preamble.
84. See How the European Union Works: Your Guide to the EU Institutions, E.U.
Commission, http://www.eurunion.org/infores/HowEUWorks072007.doc (last visited
June 2010).
85. See EU Treaty, supra note 80, at preamble. For the sake of avoiding confusion,
this Note refers to the European Union to mean both the European Economic Community
created by the EC Treaty and the European Union as it stands today.
86. See e.g., EC Treaty, supra note 22, art. 5(1) (stating that the Community “shall act
within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty and all of the objectives
assigned to it herein”); see also EC Treaty, supra note 22, art. 5(2) (stating that “in areas
which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives if the
proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore,
by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community; EC Treaty, supra note 22, art. 5(3) (stating that “any action by the Community
shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of this Treaty”).
87. See WYATT & ASHWOOD, supra note 76, at 91–97.
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Community.88 Member States cannot act autonomously, but rather, can
only act if authorized by the Community.89 In the category of shared
competence, both the Community and the Member States are competent
to exercise their shared regulatory power in a given area.90 However, in
exercising this power, Member States must concurrently comply with
their obligations under the provisions of the various treaties.91 Finally,
under the category of supporting competence, the Community establishes
broad goals in a field, but the Member States retain exclusive regulatory
power to act.92 In summary, the Community cannot act unless it has the
authority to do so under the Treaties; Member States retain competence
in areas that have not been specifically delegated to the EC.93
Based on the division of competences under the EC Treaty, both the
EU and the Member States retain regulatory control over different aspects of foreign investment.94 The EU can exercise its competence by
adopting measures relating to foreign investment to the extent that it acts
“within the limits of the power conferred upon it” by the EC Treaty.95
The EC Treaty contains a number of provisions relating to foreign investment. Under Articles 43 and 48 through 56, the Treaty provides for
rights of establishment.96 Articles 56 through 60 deal with movement of
capital.97 Under Article 310, the Treaty gives the Community the power
to conclude agreements relating to reciprocal rights and obligations.98
Finally, under Article 181, the EU can conclude agreements with developing countries.99 Thus, all of these provisions touch upon the EU’s internal and external competence relating to foreign investments. For that
reason, these provisions are coterminous with BITs.100 However, while
88. See DAVIES, supra note 78, at 25; see also WYATT & ASHWOOD, supra note 76, at
91–92 (Under the EC Treaty, exclusive competence has been uncontroversial in only
three cases: the regulation of external trade under the common commercial policy, which
is based upon Article 133 EC; the conservation of marine biological resources; and
monetary policy for those Member States which have adopted the euro).
89. See WYATT & ASHWOOD, supra note 76, at 91.
90. Id. at 92.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 95.
93. Id.
94. See Eilmansberger, supra note 20, at 389.
95. See EC Treaty, supra note 22, art. 5(1); see also Jan Ceyssens, Towards a Common Investment Policy? – Foreign Investment in the European Constitution, 32 LEGAL
ISSUES OF ECON. INTEGRATION 260 (2005).
96. EC Treaty, supra note 22, art. 43–48.
97. Id. art. 56–60.
98. Id. art. 310.
99. Id. art. 181.
100. See supra Part I.B.
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the EC Treaty contains investment-related provisions, because it does not
confer exclusive competence over foreign investment upon the EU, nor
does it confer upon the EU the power to conclude international investment agreements with non-EU countries, these areas fall within the competence of the EU Member States.101
Since the EU has limited powers to adopt measures pertaining to foreign investment under the EC Treaty, EU Member States predominantly
exercise competence in this field.102 Member States have largely implemented this power through the negotiation and conclusion of BITs.103
However, the interaction between provisions contained in BITs and the
EU legal order can lead to overlap and incompatibility issues.104 The interface between BITs entered into by EU Member States and the EU legal order is significant in two contexts: intra-EU BITs, and extra-EU
BITs.105
B. Intra-EU BITs
The majority of intra-EU BITs resulted from the relatively recent accession of twelve Central and Eastern European nations to the European
Union.106 These countries entered into BITs with EU Member States
prior to their accession, creating the current situation in which both parties to the BIT are now Member States.107 The number of intra-EU BITs
is quite significant;108 approximately 190 BITs of this nature are current-

101. See WYATT & ASHWOOD, supra note 76, at 91–97.
102. See Ceyssens, supra note 95, at 259; see also Soderlund, supra note 21, at 461.
103. See Ceyssens, supra note 95, at 268.
104. See Radu, supra note 17, at 238 (explaining the difficulty encountered by EU
Member States in concluding BITs that do not conflict with EU law and that do not prejudice foreign investors).
105. See Potesta, supra note 19, at 225.
106. In 2004, 10 countries acceded to the EU, including Malta, Cyprus, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary. Most recently, Bulgaria and Romania acceded in January 2007. 2000-Today: A Decade of Further Expansion, EUROPA.EU, http://europa.eu/abc/history/2000_today/index_en.htm (last
visited Dec. 21, 2009); see also Soderlund, supra note 21, at 455 (stating that there are
two BITs concluded between “old” EU Member States. Germany concluded BITs with
Portugal and Greece prior to their accession to the EU in 1980 and 1986, respectively.
However, no foreign investor has invoked either of these BITs in bringing an investment
dispute against one of these countries).
107. See Soderlund, supra note 21, at 455.
108. “The top signatories – Germany, UK France, Italy, The Netherlands, Belgium and
Luxembourg – count more than 500 BITs. From January 2005 to June 2006 only, European countries concluded 47 BITs.” Radu, supra note 17, at 237.
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ly in force.109 The recent influx of intra-EU BITs has generated a number
of questions concerning the relationship between EU law and the obligations these countries have undertaken through BITs.110 These questions
include whether intra-EU investment issues are governed by EC law or
the domestic law of the Member States, whether intra-EU BITs are superseded by EC law, and whether intra-EU investor-state arbitration mechanisms conflict with the EC legal order.111
These uncertainties were recently addressed through arbitral proceedings in Eastern Sugar B.V. v. Czech Republic.112 In 1991, the Czech and
Slovak Federal Republic, seeking to attract FDI to its newly established
free market economy, entered into a BIT with the Netherlands.113 In
1993, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic separated into two sovereign states, and the Czech Republic assumed the international obligations arising from the BIT concluded with the Netherlands.114 In 2003, an
investment dispute arose between Dutch sugar producer Eastern Sugar
B.V. and the Czech Republic.115 In December 2003, the dispute was
submitted to an ad hoc arbitral tribunal of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) pursuant to Article 8 of
the BIT.116 Article 8 provides in pertinent part that “[e]ach Contracting
Party hereby consents to submit a dispute . . . to an arbitral tribunal . . .
[which] shall determine its own procedure applying the arbitration rules
of UNCITRAL.”117 Subsequently, in 2004, the Czech Republic acceded
to the EU pursuant to the Accession Treaty of April 16, 2003.118 Because
109. For figures on BITs entered into by each EU Member State, see Country-Specific
Lists
of
BITs,
UNCTAD,
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=2344&lang=1 (last visited Dec.
22, 2009); see also Radu, supra note 17, at 238 (stating that the proliferation of BITs
between countries in the Eastern bloc exceeded 150 prior to these countries acceding to
the EU).
110. See Alexandrov, supra note 18.
111. See Soderlund, supra note 21, at 460.
112. Eastern Sugar B.V. v. Czech Republic, Partial Award, SCC No. 088/2004,
UNCITRAL (Mar. 27, 2007) [hereinafter Eastern Sugar].
113. Agreement on Encouragement of Reciprocal Protection of Investments Between
the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Neth.Czech Rep.-Slovk., Apr. 24, 1991. See also Eastern Sugar, supra note 112, ¶ 2 (stating
that until 2002, the Czech Republic had concluded BITs with all countries that are currently EU Member States).
114. See Eastern Sugar, supra note 112, ¶ 5.
115. See id. ¶ 12.
116. See id. ¶ 13.
117. See Agreement on encouragement and protection of investments, Czech Republic-Netherlands, supra note 112, art. 8.
118. See Eastern Sugar, supra note 112, ¶ 14.
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the Netherlands was already an EU Member State, the BIT effectively
became an intra-EU BIT.
In this investment dispute, the foreign investor of Eastern Sugar B.V.
alleged that Czech authorities discriminated against him by issuing three
decrees that adversely affected Eastern Sugar.119 The tribunal found that
the Czech Republic had violated the fair and equitable treatment standard
set forth in Article 3(1) of the BIT because one of the decrees that it issued unduly “targeted” Eastern Sugar and constituted a “discriminatory
and unreasonable measure,”120 and awarded 25 million Euros in damages
to Eastern Sugar.121 While this award was substantial, the tribunal’s decision is particularly significant for its discussion of intra-EU BITs and the
tribunal’s holding that the mere fact of accession of a country to the EU
does not render an intra-EU BIT irrelevant or invalid.122
The Czech Republic argued that the arbitral tribunal lacked jurisdiction
over claims brought by Eastern Sugar to the extent that they pertained to
a time subsequent to the Czech Republic’s accession to the EU.123 According to the Czech Republic, when it became an EU Member State,
“this changed the relationship that it had with the Netherlands sufficiently to terminate or limit the application of the BIT implicitly, and as a result, to put an end to the benefits and protection enjoyed under the BIT
by a Dutch investor such as Eastern Sugar.”124
Pursuant to the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, it was the role of the
arbitral tribunal to determine on its own whether or not it had jurisdiction
over the dispute.125 The tribunal noted that neither the Europe Agreement, under which the Czech Republic became a candidate for EU accession, nor the Accession Treaty, pursuant to which the Czech Republic
ultimately acceded to the EU, “provide expressly” that the BIT would be
terminated.126 Furthermore, the BIT itself did not state that it would be
119. See Potesta, supra note 19, at 227.
120. See Eastern Sugar, supra note 112, ¶¶ 335–338. See also Agreement on encouragement and protection of investments, Czech Republic-Netherlands, supra note 113,
art. 3(1) (stating that “[e]ach Contracting Party shall ensure fair and equitable treatment
to the investors of the other Contracting Party and shall not impair, by unreasonable or
discriminatory measures, the operation, management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or
disposal thereof by those investors”).
121. See Eastern Sugar, supra note 112, ¶ 368.
122. See Marek Wierzbowski & Aleksander Gubrynowicz, Conflict of Norms Stemming from Intra-EU BITs and EU Legal Obligations: Some Remarks on Possible Solutions in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 552–553 (2009).
123. See Eastern Sugar, supra note 112, ¶ 112.
124. Id. ¶ 117.
125. Id. ¶ 116.
126. Id. ¶ 143.
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terminated in the case that both parties became EU Member States.127
The arbitral tribunal proceeded to analyze the relationship between the
Czech Republic-Netherlands BIT and the EC Treaty under the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (“VCLT”).128
Under Article 42 of the VCLT, a treaty is only terminated according to
its own terms, or the terms of the VCLT.129 Article 59 of the VCLT provides that a treaty is terminated if 1) all the parties to it conclude a later
treaty relating to the “same subject matter,” 2) the later treaty established
that the parties “intended to be governed by that treaty,” or 3) the provisions of the later treaty “are so far incompatible with those of the earlier
one that the two treaties are not capable of being applied at the same
time.”130 The arbitrators concluded that none of these conditions were

127. See Agreement on Encouragement and Protection of Investments, Czech Republic-Netherlands, supra note 113, art. 13(2) (“Unless notice of termination has been given
by either Contracting Party at least six months before the date of the expiry of its validity,
the present Agreement shall be extended tacitly for periods of ten years, each Contracting
Party reserving the right to terminate the Agreement upon notice of at least six months
before the date of expiry of the current period of validity”).
128. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969,
115 U.N.T.S 331 (entered into force on Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
The Vienna Convention is a treaty concerning customary international law on treaties
between states, and is binding upon its signatories. As of May 2009, it has been ratified
by 109 parties, including the Czech Republic and the Netherlands. The treaty provides
the general rules for treaty interpretation.
129. Vienna Convention, supra note 128, art. 42. Article 42 of the Vienna Convention,
Validity and continuance in force of treaties, reads in its entirety:
(1) The validity of a treaty or of the consent of a State to be bound by a treaty
may be impeached only through the application of the present Convention.
(2) The termination of a treaty, its denunciation or the withdrawal of a party,
may take place only as a result of the application of the provisions of the treaty
or of the present Convention. The same rule applies to suspension of the operation of a treaty.
130. Vienna Convention, supra note 128, art. 59. Article 59 of the Vienna Convention,
Termination or suspension of the operation of a treaty implied by conclusion of a later
treaty, reads in its entirety:
(1) A treaty shall be considered terminated if all the parties to it conclude a later treaty relating to the same subject matter and (a) it appears from the later
treaty or is otherwise established that the parties intended that the matter should
be governed by that treaty; or (b) the provisions of the later treaty are so far incompatible with those of the earlier one that the two treaties are not capable of
being applied at the same time;
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met, and affirmed the tribunal’s jurisdiction over the proceedings.131
Thus, the tribunal held that “EU law has not automatically superseded
the BIT as a result of the accession of the Czech Republic to the EU.”132
Considering the number of intra-EU BITs currently in force and the
potential for the interaction between those BITs and the EU legal order to
be a factor raised in future arbitral proceedings, the Eastern Sugar decision is significant beyond this particular tribunal’s decision. The EC
Commission has pressured the Member States to terminate, or at the very
least to renegotiate, the BITs to which they are a party in order to avoid
the disparate obligations that stem from the BITs and EU Law.133 The
Commission takes the position that “there appears to be no need for
agreements of this kind in the single market” because “it would appear
that their content is superseded by Community law.”134 Some countries
have followed this suggestion.135 For example, in 2008, the BIT between
Italy and Hungary was terminated, and in 2009, the Czech Republic initiated the termination process for 23 BITs it had concluded with EU
Member States prior to its EU-accession.136
However, the majority of Member States believe that the existing BIT
framework should be maintained.137 According to their position, Member
States should be able to conclude treaties amongst themselves, and those
(2) The earlier treaty shall be considered as only suspended in operation if it
appears from the later treaty or is otherwise established that such was the intentions of the parties.
131. See Eastern Sugar, supra note 112, ¶¶ 159–171.
132. See id. ¶ 172; see also Soderlund, supra note 21, at 455 (stating that in future
scenarios like that of Eastern Sugar in which host states raise the jurisdictional defense
that a BIT is no longer operative because it became an intra-EU BIT, these foreign investors will be likely unsuccessful in invoking this defense).
133. See Wierzbowski, supra note 122, at 555.
134. EU Members Review Intra-European BITs in Light of Potential Overlap with EU
Law, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS, 20 June 2007.
135. See id; see also Alfred Escher, Current Developments, Legal Challenges an Definition of FDI, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 16–19 (Daniel D.
Bradlow & Alfred Escher eds., 1999) for a brief discussion of the EU’s goal of “furtherance of economic integration and the facilitation of cross-border investments within the
EU.” Id. at 18.
136. See UNCTAD, Recent Developments in International Investment Agreements,
supra note 16, at 5; see also Bilateral Investment Treaties and the EU, http://www.cmsaacs.com/bilateral-investment-treaties-and-the-eu-05-26-2009 (last visited Dec. 16, 2009)
(stating that despite a degree of uncertainty regarding the interface between intra-EU
BITs and the EU legal order, the Czech Republic should reconsider its plans to terminate
its intra-EU BITs, as they provide comfort to foreign investors).
137. See EU Member States Reject the Call to Terminate Intra-EU Bilateral Investment Treaties, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS, 10 February 2009.
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treaties currently in force between Member States should remain so as
long as the Member States comply with their obligations under the EC
Treaty.138 At this time, the issue has not been brought to the European
Court of Justice (“ECJ”),139 and thus, the potential for inconsistent decisions by arbitral tribunals leaves the status of intra-EU BITs unclear.140
C. Extra-EU BITs
Incompatibility problems also arise in the context of extra-EU BITs.
Under Article 307(2) of the EC Treaty, Member States “shall take all
appropriate steps to eliminate the incompatibilities” between their treaty
obligations with non-EU countries and their obligations under the EC
Treaty.141 This treaty provision suggests that recently acceded Member
States must renegotiate their BITs with non-EU Member States in order
to eliminate inconsistency with EU law.142 However, under Article
307(1) of the EC Treaty, the “rights and obligations arising from agreements . . . or acceding States, before the date of their accession, between
one or more Member State on the one hand, and one or more third countries on the other, shall not be affected by the provisions of this Treaty.”143 Nonetheless, several Member States have followed the suggestion
of the Commission. For example, in 2003, the European Commission,
the United States, and eight Central Eastern European Countries preparing to join the European Union, signed a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU), which ensured that the BITs concluded between the U.S. and
these acceding countries were compatible with the EU’s laws and regula138. See Lorenza Mola, Which Role for the EU in the Development of International
Investment Law? para. 5.1 (Soc’y of Int’l Econ. Law, Working Paper No. 27/08, 2008),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1154583.
139. The jurisdiction of the ECJ includes the power to bring enforcement actions
against Member States. In the future the European Commission may bring a direct action
against Member States that it deems are failing to fulfill its obligations under EU law by
refusing to terminate intra-EU BITs. See DAVIES, supra note 78, at 40–41; see also CHOW
& SCHOENBAUM, supra note 27, at 125 (stating that the ECJ consists of one judge from
each EU Member State and has the final word in interpreting the EC Treaty).
140. See Potesta, supra note 19, at 238.
141. EC Treaty, supra note 22, art. 307.
142. See UNCTAD, Recent Developments in International Investment Agreements,
supra note 16, at 5 (stating that “in 2008 the Czech Republic concluded five protocols on
the amendment to originals BITs, a process reported as negotiations of BITs. These negotiations are in response to article 307 of the Treaty establishing the European Community
(EC Treaty) and seek to bring the country’s BITs into conformity with EU law”); see also
UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2003: FDI Policies for Development; National and
International Perspectives, supra note 3, at 59 (stating that “EU-accession countries will
have to harmonize their FDI regimes with EU regulations”).
143. EC Treaty, supra note 22, art. 307.
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tions.144 While the MOU represents forward progress in the elimination
of existing incompatibilities, it does not have legal force and only applies
to the specific BITs designated in the memorandum.145 For that reason,
all other extra-EU BITs remain susceptible to compatibility issues.146
The incompatibility problems arising from the relationship between the
EU legal order and extra-EU BITs were recently addressed in European
Commission v. Republic of Austria147 and European Commission v. Republic of Sweden.148 In these cases, the European Commission brought
infringement proceedings under Article 307(2) of the EC Treaty against
Austria and Sweden; the Commission alleged that the countries had
failed to harmonize provisions contained in BITs with non-EU Member
States negotiated prior to their accession to the EU with EU law.149 Prior
to their accession to the EU, Austria and Sweden entered into BITs with
several non-European countries.150 All of these BITs contained clauses
“under which each party guarantee[d] to the investors of the other party .
. . the free transfer . . . of payments connected with an investment.”151 In
144. See Eight Acceding Countries and U.S. Sign Bilateral Investment Understanding,
UNION
DELEGATION
TO
THE
U.S.A.
(Sept.
23,
2003),
EUR.
http://www.eurunion.org/eu/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2079&Item
id=58 (stating that “A number of provisions in the BITs were contrary to the existing EU
legislation and needed to be amended prior to accession. The acceding countries concerned are Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and
Slovakia. The European Commission is pleased that a satisfactory solution has been
found, showing that EU enlargement can be beneficial to third countries”).
145. See Radu, supra note 17, at 238.
146. See id.
147. See C-205/06, European Commission v. Republic of Austria, [2009] E.C.R. [hereinafter Austria Proceedings].
148. See C-249/06, European Commission v. Republic of Sweden, [2009] E.C.R. [hereinafter Sweden Proceedings].
149. See Austria Proceedings, supra note 147; Sweden Proceedings, supra note 148;
see also EC Treaty, supra note 22, art. 226 (explaining that if the Commission believes
that a Member State has failed to fulfill an obligation under the EC Treaty, it shall give
the country formal notice of its opinion on the matter and provide the country with the
opportunity to submit its own observations. If the country does not comply with the
Commission’s opinion, the Commission can commence infringement proceedings against
a Member State which it believes has infringed upon Community law); EC Treaty, supra
note 22, art. 230 (stating that the ECJ has jurisdiction over infringement proceedings
brought by the European Commission against Member States); Potesta, supra note 19, at
238.
150. See Austria Proceedings, supra note 147, ¶ 1 (listing the countries that Austria
entered into BITs with prior to its EU-accession); Sweden Proceedings, supra note 148, ¶
1 (listing the countries that Sweden entered into BITs with prior to its EU-accession).
151. See Austria Proceedings, supra note 147, ¶ 3; Sweden Proceedings, supra note
148, ¶ 3.
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both cases, the Commission objected to these clauses, maintaining that
they precluded Austria and Sweden from complying with their obligations under the EC Treaty.152 Because these EC Treaty provisions guaranteed the free transfer of capital, they clashed with Article 57(2),153 Article 59,154 and Article 60155 of the EC Treaty, which enable the EU to
regulate movement of capital between EU Member States and non-EU
countries, as well as restrict the flow of capital in exceptional circumstances.156 Thus, the Commission argued that Austria and Sweden failed
to take appropriate steps to eliminate incompatibilities with their obligations under these BITs and under the EC Treaty.157
The major point of contention in European Commission v. Republic of
Austria and European Commission v. Republic of Sweden was the extent
to which Article 307(2) of the EC Treaty requires Member States to ensure that their BITs with non-EU countries comply with EU law.158 In
regards to the pertinent EC Treaty articles, the Commission had never
before had the opportunity to exercise its powers.159 In other words, no
situation had ever arisen in which the Commission found it necessary to
exercise its competence and adopt measures pursuant to Article 57(2),
Article 59, or Article 60 of the EC Treaty. Therefore, the incompatibility
alleged by the Commission was “merely hypothetical until the Council
adopt[ed] the relevant provisions.”160 The Commission argued that the
Member States were required to eliminate even potential compatibilities

152. See Austria Proceedings, supra note 147, ¶ 6; Sweden Proceedings, supra note
148, ¶ 6.
153. See EC Treaty, supra note 22, art. 57(2). Under Article 57(2), the European
Council may adopt measures on the movement of capital to and from non-EU countries
“which constitute a step back in Community law as regards the liberalisation of the
movement of capital to or from third countries.”
154. See EC Treaty, supra note 22, art. 59. Under Article 59, the Council may take
safeguard measures restricting capital flows to non-EU countries in “exceptional circumstances” if it deems such measures to be “strictly necessary.”
155. See EC Treaty, supra note 22, art. 60. Under Article 60, the Council may “take
the necessary urgent measures on the movement of capital and on payments as regards
the third countries concerned.”
156. See Austria Proceedings, supra note 147, ¶ 11; Sweden Proceedings, supra note
148, ¶ 11.
157. See Austria Proceedings, supra note 147, ¶ 6; Sweden Proceedings, supra note
148, ¶ 6.
158. See Potesta, supra note 19, at 241.
159. Id. at 238.
160. Id. at 241.
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when Article 307 is read in conjunction with Article 10 of the EC Treaty.161 Article 10 sets forth a duty of loyalty and cooperation, under which:
Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or
particular, to ensure fulfillment of the obligations arising out of this
Treaty or resulting from action taken by the institutions of the Community. They shall facilitate the achievement of the Community’s tasks.
They shall abstain from any measure which could jeopardize the attainment of the objectives of this Treaty.162

While the ECJ did not adopt the Commission’s reasoning, it nevertheless
held that the Member States had breached their obligations under Article
307 of the EC Treaty.163
As was the case in Eastern Sugar, the implications of the court’s decisions extend beyond the BITs concluded by Austria and Sweden, as other
EU Member States are parties to hundreds of BITs with non-EU countries. In its judgments, the ECJ clarified that its holding does not apply
only to Austrian and Swedish BITs entered into with non-EU countries,
but to all Member States that are parties to BITs containing similar provisions.164 In general, the judgments reflect a broad interpretation of Article 307, suggesting that Member States must eliminate even potential
incompatibilities between the BITs and EC law.165 In this way, endless
scenarios for incompatibility can be envisioned.166 Unless the Council
takes it upon itself to bring infringement proceedings against Member
States that are encroaching on EU law through their BITs, the individual
Member States are unlikely to examine their BITs on their own accord,
identify potential incompatibilities, and then work with the non-EU
country to amend the treaty.167
III. BITS AND THE EU LEGAL ORDER POST-LISBON
On December 1, 2009, the Lisbon Treaty entered into effect.168 The
treaty amends the current principal sources of law of the EU, namely the
161. See Austria Proceedings, supra note 147, ¶ 11; Sweden Proceedings, supra note
148, ¶ 11.
162. See EC Treaty, supra note 22, art. 10.
163. See Austria Proceedings, supra note 147, ¶ 45; Sweden Proceedings, supra note
148, ¶ 45.
164. See Austria Proceedings, supra note 147, ¶ 43; Sweden Proceedings, supra note
148, ¶ 43.
165. See Potesta, supra note 19, at 243.
166. See id.
167. See id. at 237.
168. See Treaty of Lisbon: Taking Europe into the 21st Century, EUROPA.EU,
http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/index_en.htm (last visited June 1, 2010); see also Dan Bi-
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EC Treaty and the EU Treaty.169 After years of debate, the Lisbon Treaty
extends EU competence to the fields of trade and services, trade related
aspects of intellectual property, and, in a “major innovation, to foreign
direct investment.”170 These fields are all brought within the ambit of the
Common Commercial Policy (“CCP”), the section of the Lisbon Treaty
which establishes the basis of the EU’s legal position in its international
economic relations, as well as one of the few areas in which the EU retains exclusive competence.171 This marks a significant departure from
the EC Treaty prior to the Lisbon amendments, under which the CCP
only extended to the field of external trade.172 In this way the Lisbon
Treaty “reflects a new governance arrangement and legal order that was
not contemplated by the current investment system.”173
Because the Lisbon Treaty very recently entered into effect, it remains
to be seen how its new provisions under the CCP will be interpreted and
applied. However, the Lisbon Treaty certainly has the potential to present
considerable implications for the relationship between the EU legal order
and the system of BITs with respect to the contentious realm of FDI.174
While neither the EC Treaty nor the EU Treaty contain provisions specifically referencing FDI, Article 206 and Article 207(1) of the Lisbon
Treaty unequivocally bring FDI under the auspice of the CCP.175 The
lefsky & Stephen Castle, Way is Clear to Centralize Europe’s Power, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
4, 2009, at A6 (stating that on November 3, 2009, the Lisbon Treaty “cleared its last major hurdle,” as the president of the Czech Republic was the last European leader to sign
the treaty).
169. See Treaty of Lisbon: Taking Europe into the 21st Century, supra note 168.
170. See Stephen Woolcock, The Potential Impact of the Lisbon Treaty on European
Union External Trade Policy, SWEDISH INST. FOR EUR. POL’Y ANALYSIS, June 2008, at 1.
171. See Bungenberg, supra note 28, at 124.
172. EC Treaty, supra note 22, art. 133.
173. See L. Yves Fortier, Chairman, Address at the British Institute of International
and Comparative Law 50th Anniversary Series, Investment Protection and the Rule of
Law: Change or Decline? (Mar. 17, 2009).
174. See Woolcock, supra note 170, at 4.
175. See Lisbon Treaty, supra note 25. The Lisbon Treaty inserts the new heading
“External Action by the Union.” Under this heading, Title II sets forth the “Common
Commercial Policy.” Article 131 of the EC Treaty, supra note 22, read: “By establishing
a customs union between themselves Member States aim to contribute, in the common
interest, to the harmonious development of world trade, the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade and the lowering of customs barriers.” Under the Lisbon
Treaty, this wording is replaced by the following: “By establishing a customs union in
accordance with Articles 23 to 27, the Union shall contribute, in the common interest, the
harmonious development of world trade, the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade and on foreign direct investment, and the lowering of customs and other
barriers.” Article 133(1) of the EC Treaty read: “The common commercial policy shall be
based on uniform principles, particularly in regard to changes in tariff rates, the conclu-
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Lisbon Treaty adds the term “foreign direct investment” within the scope
of coverage of the CCP, but the intent of this language is ambiguous,
and, thus, it remains unclear whether these FDI provisions in effect circumscribe the existing domestic competence of the Member States.176 In
other words, it is uncertain whether the Lisbon Treaty grants the EU exclusive competence over liberalization, protection, and promotion of
FDI,177 or only to the liberalization of FDI178 in general.179 At the same
time, employing a strict textual reading, the language of the Lisbon Treaty now grants the EU exclusive power over the field of FDI, and does not
cite any exceptions.180
IV. PROBLEMS ARISING FROM THE TRANSFER OF COMPETENCE OVER
FDI AND SOME PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
The EU’s objective in bringing FDI under the auspice of the CCP is to
improve efficiency in foreign investment negotiations, and to eliminate
the complications that arise from a system of intertwined competences.181
However, this aim will be thwarted if there is an expedited overhaul of
the current legal structure for the protection of foreign investment. If the
EU seeks to improve its competitive position in the global economy as an
sion of tariff and trade agreements, the achievement of uniformity in measures of liberalization, export policy and measures to protect trade such as those to be taken in the event
of dumping or subsidies.” Under the Lisbon Treaty, this is replaced as follows: “The
common commercial policy shall be based on uniform principles, particularly with regard
to changes in tariff rates, the conclusion of tariff and trade agreements relating to trade in
goods and services, and the commercial aspects of intellectual property, foreign direct
investment, the achievement of uniformity in measures of liberalization, export policy
and measures to protect trade such as those to be taken in the event of dumping or subsidies. The common commercial policy shall be conducted in the context of the principles
and objectives of the Union’s external action.” (emphasis added). Furthermore, the Lisbon Treaty adds the following language: “For the negotiation and conclusion of agreements in the field of trade in services and the commercial aspects of intellectual property,
as well as foreign direct investment, the Council shall act unanimously where such
agreements include provisions for which unanimity is required for the adoption of internal rules.” (emphasis added).
176. See Eilmansberger, supra note 20, at 394.
177. Significantly, the liberalization, promotion and protection of FDI are considered
the three fundamental goals of BITs. See Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 5, at 68.
178. Investment liberalization generally refers to the creation of an investment climate
in which foreign investors undertake investments that they judge to be in their interest
rather than in the interest of the host country. See id. at 78–79.
179. See Mola supra note 138, para. 3.2.
180. Bungenberg, supra note 28.
181. See supra Part II; see also Ceyssens, supra note 95, at 269 (“[T]he current procedures involving both Member States and the EU in the conclusion and implementation of
international agreements are excessively burdensome”).
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economic superpower, it needs to maintain a transparent, stable system
for the regulation of foreign investment.182 If foreign investors believe
that the EU’s system does not provide adequate protection, they may
choose to retract their investments. This will make it difficult for the EU
to attract new foreign investors who will likely forego opportunities in
the EU to avoid the problems associated with an unstable investment regime. Furthermore, the BITs entered into by EU Member States are part
of a dense international network of BITs, and a disruption of this system
could be detrimental to the EU’s foreign relations. Therefore, in responding to the challenges that lie ahead, it is crucial that the EU make a gradual, deliberate transition from a system in which Member States have
the competence to conclude BITs, to a system in which the EU retains
exclusive competence over FDI. While the transfer of competence over
FDI from the individual EU Member States to the EU creates a number
of problems, if these problems are adequately dealt with, then the
changes to FDI embodied in the Lisbon Treaty will represent an improvement over the EU’s prior international investment regime.
A. Will EU Member States Retain the Competence to Negotiate and Conclude BITs in the Future?
Article 207 of the Lisbon Treaty does not define the scope of the EU’s
authority over FDI, leaving the provision open to disparate interpretations.183 According to Dr. Stephen Woolcock, some Member States interpret Article 207 to grant the EU exclusive competence over FDI only
as it relates to investment liberalization.184 Under this narrow interpretation, the EU would have exclusive power to negotiate and conclude international investment agreements providing for pre-establishment national treatment,185 but not to the protection of foreign investment once it
has entered the country.186 Therefore, Member States would retain their
competence to conclude BITs. Alternatively, some Member States, as

182. See Bungenberg, supra note 28, at 125 (“Economic growth, employment and
prosperity can only be achieved if the EU itself is competitive on the international level,
which from a legal point of view is primarily determined by its constitutional basis and
options”).
183. See Woolcock, supra note 170, at 4; see also Alexandrov, supra note 18.
184. See Woolcock, supra note 170, at 4.
185. See OECD, STABILITY PACT: SOUTHEAST EUROPE COMPACT FOR REFORM,
INVESTMENT, INTEGRITY AND GROWTH, 11 (Oct. 2003) (“National treatment in preestablishment is the commitment of a (host) country to accord to the investment by nonresident enterprises in its territory, including the right of establishment, treatment no less
favourable than that accorded in like situations to resident enterprises.”)
186. See Woolcock, supra note 170, at 4.
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well as the Commission, interpret Article 207 more broadly, so that FDI
includes both investment liberalization and investment protection.187 Under this broader interpretation, EU Member States would no longer be
able to negotiate and conclude BITs on their own, as the substantive aspects of investment protection would fall exclusively under the competence of the EU.188 Because these two interpretations have such different
implications for the future of the EU’s international investment policy,
there is a need for legal certainty.
The EU must approach this issue pragmatically. If the EU adopts the
narrow interpretation of Article 207, then it will not achieve its objectives in bringing FDI under the auspice of the CCP. This is because the
EU would still need to deal with the incompatibility and inconsistency
problems that arise from a system of shared competence.189 On the other
hand, the EU’s adoption of the broader interpretation of Article 207
would entail an immediate, disruptive overhaul of the legal infrastructure
created by the BIT network. In order to avoid these problems, the EU
should adopt the broader interpretation so that both the liberalization and
the protection of FDI fall under the competence of the EU, but the EU
should exercise its newfound competence gradually.
While the Lisbon Treaty itself does not provide for any kind of transition period, this does not prevent the EU from establishing one. In
Donckerwolcke v. Procureur de la Republique,190 the ECJ held that even
though the EU has exclusive competence with regard to the CCP, derogation is permitted where the EU specifically authorizes the Member
States to act.191 Thus, the EU could authorize the Member States to continue to negotiate and conclude BITs, but could establish a definitive
timeline so that eventually the Member States will no longer have this
power. This approach will enable the EU to articulate its long-term objective by stating that it retains the exclusive authority over all aspects of
FDI, but is temporarily deviating from this policy in order to ensure a
smoother transition to a system of exclusive competence. This type of
transition period will make the policy clear to non-EU countries, prepare
EU Member States and foreign investors for what is to come, and avoid
an immediate overhaul of a well-established system. By gradually phas187. Id.
188. See supra Part II.C.
189. Id.
190. See C-41/76, Donckerwolcke v. Procureur de la République [1976] E.C.R. 1921.
191. See id. ¶ 32 (“As full responsibility in the matter of the commercial policy was
transferred to the Community by means of Article 113(1) measures of commercial policy
of a national character are only permissible . . . by virtue of specific authorization by the
Community”).
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ing out BITs, the EU will have the opportunity to further develop its own
foreign investment policy and conclude international investment treaties
that provide foreign investors with adequate protection.
Finally, the EU should also commence discussions on “portfolio investment,” which is not encompassed by the EU’s authority over FDI.192
Many BITs provide for an expansive definition of “investment,” which
includes “portfolio investment.”193 Therefore, by explicitly referring only
to FDI in the CCP, the Lisbon Treaty leaves some types of foreign investment outside the scope of the EU’s exclusive competence. This will
most likely permit individual Member States to continue to conclude
BITs, albeit only in terms of the regulation of portfolio investment.
While the Lisbon Treaty aims for a streamlined approach in the conclusion of these types of agreements, the EU’s failure to conclude comprehensive agreements pertaining to foreign investment will certainly frustrate this objective by maintaining a fragmented system. Foreign investors will need to enter into investment agreements with the EU for the
protection of FDI, and will separately need to enter into bilateral agreements with the individual Member States in order to protect their portfolio investments.
B. What is the Legal Status of Existing BITs Concluded by EU Member
States?
Another problem arising from the transfer of competence over FDI
from Member States to the EU is the unclear legal status of existing BITs
between EU Member States and non-EU countries. Pursuant to Article
307(2) of the EC Treaty, EU Member States “shall take all appropriate
steps to eliminate the incompatibilities” between their treaty obligations
with non-EU countries and their obligations under the EC Treaty.194 Article 351 of the Lisbon Treaty incorporates this exact language.195 Therefore, EU Member States must ensure that incompatibilities stemming
from their BIT obligations with non-EU countries conform to EU law
now that the EU has been granted exclusive competence over FDI. If an
expansive definition of FDI were adopted, then it would appear that in
order to conform to Article 351, Member States must either terminate
their BITs or dramatically amend their provisions, as they deal predomi-

192.
193.
194.
195.

See supra Part II.B.
See id.
See EC Treaty, supra note 22, art. 307(2).
See Lisbon Treaty, supra note 25, art. 351.
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nantly with FDI. However, this is impractical given the number of BITs
to which Member States are parties.196
Furthermore, requiring EU Member States to terminate their BITs is
contrary to customary international law.197 Under Article 27 of the
VCLT, “a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.”198 Under Article 42 of the
VCLT, “the termination of a treaty, its denunciation or the withdrawal of
a party, may take place only as a result of the application of the provisions of the treaty or the present Convention.”199 Under Article 59 of the
VCLT:
[A] treaty shall be considered as terminated if all the parties to it conclude a later treaty relating to the same subject matter and . . . it appears
from the later treaty or is otherwise established that the parties intended
that the matter should be governed by that treaty . . . or the provisions
of the later treaty are so far incompatible with those of the earlier one
that the two parties are not capable of being applied at the same time.200

Based on these VCLT provisions, Member States cannot be legally
forced to terminate their BITs.
The majority of BITs provide that the agreement shall remain in force
for a period of ten years, and at the end of each ten-year period either
party may choose to terminate the BIT by providing notice to the other
party.201 Furthermore, BITs often provide that if a party terminates a BIT
according to its terms, the investments covered by its provisions will
continue to be protected under the agreement for a specified number of
years.202 Forcing EU Member States to immediately terminate their BITs
would be at odds with Article 42 of the VCLT because termination must
be governed by the termination terms contained within each individual
BIT. Furthermore, Article 59 is inapplicable because the non-EU Member States that are parties to the BITs with EU Member States are not
196. See Bungenberg, supra note 28, at 135 (Of the nearly 2,600 BITs concluded
worldwide, the 27 EU Member States are parties to 1,300 of those treaties).
197. See Vienna Convention, supra note 128.
198. Id. art. 27.
199. Id. art. 42.
200. Id. art. 59.
201. For example, in the BIT concluded between Pakistan and Germany, the provision
related to termination reads: “[This Agreement] shall remain in force for a period of ten
years and shall continue in force thereafter for an unlimited period unless notice of termination is given in writing by either Party on year before it expiry.” Pak.—F.R.G. BIT,
supra note 15, art. 13(2).
202. Id. art. 13(3) (“In respect of investments made prior to the date of expiry of the
present Treaty, the provisions of Articles 1 to 13 shall continue to be effective for a further period of ten years from the date of expiry to the present Treaty”).
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also parties to the Lisbon Treaty. While the Lisbon Treaty arguably covers the same subject matter, the Lisbon Treaty is not binding on these
countries and, therefore, cannot supersede existing BITs.
Because it would be both impractical and contrary to international law
to call for the immediate termination of extra-EU BITs, an interim system needs to be established in order to facilitate a gradual transition to
exclusive EU competence over FDI. This could be accomplished by allowing the BITs to terminate according to their own terms. At the end of
the ten-year periods, the EU Member States could give notice to the other party that they intend to terminate the respective treaty. As these BITs
expire, they can then be replaced by agreements negotiated and concluded by the EU. At the same time, Member States must ensure, as is
required by Article 307 of the EC Treaty and now Article 351 of the Lisbon Treaty, that their BITs comply with all other provisions of EU
law.203 If not, these EU Member States should renegotiate and amend
these treaties.204 This approach is in the best interest of the EU because it
will reduce the likelihood that foreign investors withdraw their investments in EU countries out of the concern that these investments are not
protected under an investment treaty. Furthermore, EU Member States
will be complying with customary international law under the VCLT,
and therefore will not be destroying their legitimacy and harming their
relations with foreign countries.
C. Is the EU Capable of Concluding International Investment Agreements Comparable to BITs?
Prior to the Lisbon Treaty entering into force, the EU negotiated treaties addressing investment-related issues, but none which dealt exclusively and comprehensively with the liberalization and protection of a
broad range of investments.205 These EU treaties differ significantly from
BITs which provide for both substantive and procedural protections of
foreign investment.206 Because the EU is not accustomed to negotiating
and concluding BITs, it could take the transition period proposed in the
previous two sections of this Note to further develop its investment policy platform. It could create a “Model International Investment Agreement” that contains provisions comparable to those contained in BITs.
203. See EC Treaty, supra note 22, art. 307(2); see also Lisbon Treaty, supra note 25,
art. 351.
204. See supra Part II.C. The ECJ Infringement Proceedings Brought Against Austria
and Sweden did not only apply to those two particular countries, but rather the decision
applies to all EU Member States.
205. See supra Part II.A.
206. Id.
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This model agreement should provide for the main substantive protections afforded under BITs, including national treatment, most favored
nation, compensation for expropriation, and rights to transfer capital and
returns.207 In particular, the EU should develop a procedural mechanism
for the settlement of investment disputes that will likely arise under its
newly negotiated and concluded agreements.208 By taking these steps, the
EU will be able to maintain a stable regime for the regulation of foreign
investment. If not, foreign countries will be reluctant to enter into investment agreements with the EU that do not provide for conditions as
favorable as those provided under BITs.
The EU does not currently have an international dispute settlement regime comparable to the ad hoc system prescribed in BITs.209 Therefore,
as the situation stands, foreign investors would need to bring their investment dispute claims against the EU before the ECJ.210 According to
Peter Ondrusek, a consultant for the United Nations Industrial Development Organization:
[T]here are not necessarily any real obstacles in principle for the EC to
become a party to an international investment-dispute arbitration system. However, there are some obstacles on the part of the current international investor-State arbitration system to be able to accommodate reliably the EC.211

The main forum chosen for dispute settlement under BITs is the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).212 However, the EU is not a party to the ISCID.213 Under Article 67 of the
ICSID Convention, the convention is open for signature on behalf of
States that are members of the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, as well as States that are parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice and have been invited to sign the convention by
the Administrative Council of the International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes.214 While the EU is not a state, it should neverthe207. See supra Part I.B.
208. See Wierzbowski, supra note 122, at 546 (“[I]n many ways a BIT, with its unique
opportunity to force a host State to respond to arbitrators, is a clear advantage and no
comparable mechanism is at investors’ disposal under EC law rules”).
209. Mola, supra note 138, at para. 1.5.
210. Id.
211. See Peter Ondruskek, EC and Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Some Thoughts,
a paper delivered at the BIICL, Investment Treaty Forum: European Law and Investment
Treaties: Exploring the Grey Areas, (Dec. 4, 2008).
212. See ICSID Convention, supra note 68.
213. See id. art. 25 for a list of all the parties to the ICSID Convention.
214. Id. art. 67.

2010]

BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES AND THE EU

881

less attempt to become a party to an impartial investment dispute forum.215 This way, as BITs concluded by EU Member States are gradually
phased out, foreign investors will still have access to the procedural mechanisms that make BITs such attractive agreements.
CONCLUSION
This Note has explored the nature of the relationship between BITs
concluded by EU Member States and the EU legal order, and the potential impact on this interface now that the Lisbon Treaty has entered into
force. It remains to be seen how the challenges of the EU’s international
investment system will be resolved in the future. Prior to the passage of
the Lisbon Treaty, a system of shared competence in the realm of foreign
investment led to incompatibility and overlap issues that made it difficult
for the EU to act as a united front. At the same time, this BIT network
has been in place for over five decades and provides benefits to countries
seeking to attract foreign investors, as well as to foreign investors who
seek protection against the inherent risks associated with their investments. While the Lisbon Treaty brings FDI under the auspice of the
Common Commercial Policy, the simple addition of the term “foreign
direct investment” does not indicate how the EU’s exclusive competence
over FDI will be interpreted and applied, and whether or not it is intended to completely displace the current BIT network.
Because of the need for legal certainty, the EU’s current system of
BITs should remain intact in the short term, as it provides for investment
protection and arbitral dispute mechanisms of which there are no viable
equivalents under the Lisbon Treaty. While the EU’s exclusive competence over FDI is a logical step in the movement toward a more streamlined, comprehensive multilateral EU trade and investment system, an
expedited overhaul of the current legal structure would foster uncertainty
and be detrimental to the EU’s continued ability to attract FDI and manage foreign-investor expectations. It would be imprudent to immediately
do away with the standing BIT system until the EU is able to develop a
stable and transparent international investment framework. Therefore,
the EU should implement a transition period in which it can gradually
adapt to its new, exclusive authority to negotiate and conclude international investment treaties. Dr. Stephen Woolcock states, “The inclusion
of FDI in EU competence is an important step towards the creation of a
comprehensive EU approach to trade and investment that reflects the
nature of the international economy in which trade and investment are

215. See supra Part I.B.
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inextricably linked.”216 The EU must take gradual and deliberate action
in order to improve its international investment regime.
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